Table of Contents
- 1 What does Derek Parfit believe makes the same person over time?
- 2 What does parfit say about personal identity?
- 3 What is parfit referring to when he talks about split brain cases?
- 4 Why our identity is not what matters Derek Parfit?
- 5 Who suggested that the self is identical to consciousness?
- 6 What is the Teletransportation thought experiment about?
- 7 What is Parfit’s objection to the existence of a person?
- 8 What is the physical criterion according to Parfit?
What does Derek Parfit believe makes the same person over time?
People exist in the same way that nations or clubs exist. Following David Hume, Parfit argued that no unique entity, such as a self, unifies a person’s experiences and dispositions over time. Therefore personal identity is not “what matters” in survival.
What does parfit say about personal identity?
Parfit ends up concluding that personal identity is not what matters. What matters is psychological continuity and connectedness. We can still talk about personal identity, but it will just be a convention. We can call teletransportation dying, or not.
What does Parfit’s transporter tale show about personal identity?
at the center of derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons is nestled a famous short story about a person who uses a teletransporter. Parfit argues that his “thought experiment” shows that “personal identity”—as (analytic) philosophy understands it—doesn’t matter.
What point does parfit make in his imaginary cases of Teletransportation?
For Parfit, adherence to the Physical Criterion implies rejecting the teletransporter as a form of travel — instead, it’s simply a perverse form of dying and death.
What is parfit referring to when he talks about split brain cases?
Parfit describes split-brain patients being presented with two colours: red in the left half of their visual field and blue in the right half. Differences in visual experience associated with left and right hemispheres in split-brain patients are an established fact, documented in many studies.
Why our identity is not what matters Derek Parfit?
Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause.
Why our identity is not what matters Parfit?
What is Parfit referring to when he talks about split brain cases?
Who suggested that the self is identical to consciousness?
Locke
Chapter XXVII on “Identity and Diversity” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke, 1689/1997) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualisations of consciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself, in which Locke gives his account of identity and personal identity in the second edition …
What is the Teletransportation thought experiment about?
“Suppose that you enter a cubicle in which, when you press a button, a scanner records the states of all the cells in your brain and body, destroying both while doing so.
Why our identity is not what matters parfit?
What is Parfit’s view of further fact?
Parfit draws a distinction between two different kinds of views about a certain thing. According to a non-reductionist view of something, the existence of that kind of thing is a ‘further fact’, which goes beyond the existence of other facts, not about the existence of that kind of thing.
What is Parfit’s objection to the existence of a person?
A third objection which Parfit considers is based on Reid’s objection that the psychological theory ignores the fact that the existence of a person is not based on continuity of experiences, but on continuity of the subject of those experiences, which is something above and beyond those experiences themselves:
What is the physical criterion according to Parfit?
2.1 The physical criterion. Parfit describes what he calls ‘the standard view’ of the existence of ordinary material objects, like billiard balls (p. 203). Applied to persons, this is the view that the existence of persons over time consists in “the physical continuity, over time, of my brain and body.
Is Parfit’s theory of personal identity transitive?
Parfit’s solution of this problem in terms of the distinction between direct psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Though the former is not transitive, the latter is; so Reid’s objection to analyses of personal identity in terms of the latter does not hold.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGhm8CVnwck