Can there be 3 Nash equilibrium?
6 Answers. You have 3 Nash equilibria: (PC,PC), (MAC,MAC) and also one in mixed strategies where each player chooses PC with probability 3/5 and MAC with prob. 2/5.
How many Nash equilibrium can there be?
In this case there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, when both choose to either drive on the left or on the right….Coordination game.
| Player 1 strategy | Player 2 strategy | |
|---|---|---|
| Player 2 adopts strategy A | Player 2 adopts strategy B | |
| Player 1 adopts strategy B | 1 3 | 2 2 |
Do all players have a dominant strategy in Nash equilibrium?
Dominant strategies are considered as better than other strategies, no matter what other players might do. It must be noted that any dominant strategy equilibrium is always a Nash equilibrium. However, not all Nash equilibria are dominant strategy equilibria.
What does multiple Nash equilibrium mean?
Nash equilibrium is a concept within game theory where the optimal outcome of a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from the initial strategy. A game may have multiple Nash equilibria or none at all.
How does a repeated game relate to a simultaneous move game?
In game theory, repeated games, also known as supergames, are those that play out over and over for a period of time, and therefore are usually represented using the extensive form. This means that the strategy space is greater than in any regular simultaneous or sequential game.
What does simultaneous mean in game theory?
In game theory, a simultaneous game or static game is a game where each player chooses their action without knowledge of the actions chosen by other players. Simultaneous games contrast with sequential games, which are played by the players taking turns (moves alternate between players).
How the concept of best response and Nash equilibrium relate to each other?
The concept of a best response is central to John Nash’s best-known contribution, the Nash equilibrium, the point at which each player in a game has selected the best response (or one of the best responses) to the other players’ strategies (Nash 1950).